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NO MORE SOFT LANDINGS FOR SOFTWARE:
LIABILITY FOR DEFECTS IN AN INDUSTRY
THAT HAS COME OF AGE
Frances E. Zollers, Andrew McMullin, Sandra N. Hurd,
and Peter Shearst
I. INTRODUCTION
This is not a tale of robots gone wild or other stuff of science
fiction. Rather, this is about real-life situations that have occurred or
are likely to occur. It is about software failure when that failure leads,
not to system crashes or botched tax returns, but to serious physical
injury to persons. The power of software can be seen everywhere: It
flies airplanes, monitors medical patients and nuclear power plants,
and even helps us drive our cars. Indeed, software is no longer
confined to the domain of business systems that control inventory,
issue payroll checks, and keep track of accounts receivable and
payable. It extends beyond the desktop computer with its word
processing and data management capabilities and now routinely
interfaces with human beings in their daily lives and in unseen ways.
The consequence, however, is that some software can cause physical
injury if it is defective. While many early commentators have
speculated about the liability regime when such a condition occurs,' it
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1. Vincent M. Brannigan & Ruth E. Dayhoff, Liability for Personal Injuries Caused by
Defective Medical Computer Programs, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 123 (1981); Bruce Ducker, Liability
for Computer Software, 26 BuS. LAW. 1081 (1971); Roy N. Freed, Legal Questions in a
Computer Society, TRIAL, Jan./Feb. 1971, at 39 [hereinafter Freed, Legal Questions]; Roy N.
746 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 1... [Vol. 21
is now time to take stock of how the law is developing and should
develop when software foreseeably causes physical injury.
The discussion is timely for a number of reasons. First, there
have been sufficient numbers of instances of software failure that
have caused physical injury2 to cause serious concern, and the number
can only grow, given the pervasiveness of software in our daily lives.
Second, the software industry is no longer in its infancy. Its
development has moved out of garages and into corporate offices. It
has matured to become a dominant sector of the economy.
Consequently, it is appropriate to consider liability for defective
software in the same light as liability for defective automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, and other products.
This article will first examine the characteristics of software and
its evolutionary creep into our lives in Part II. In Parts III and IV, we
will review the literature about software litigation and the eras
through which it has progressed. Part V reviews the origins of strict
product liability and the policies underlying it to determine whether
software, which has hitherto enjoyed immunity from strict liability,
fits into the strict liability context. Lastly, in Part VI we argue for the
adoption of a strict liability regime for software failure that produces
physical injury and offer supporting arguments for why such a move
is both necessary and sensible.
II. COMPUTER HISTORY 101
While many think that computers, software, and computing are
relatively new developments, this is not really the case. A timeline
showing the major events in the history of the development of the
computer should really start with Napier's bones in the 17th Century
and include such developments as Pascal's adding machine,
Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 17 JURIMETRICS J. 270 (1977) [hereinafter
Freed, Computer Age]; Roy N. Freed, The Effect of Computer Technology on Legal Liability
(1962) (proceedings of Wisconsin Eighth Annual Corporate Lawyer's Institute), in ROY N.
FREED, COMPUTERS AND LAW - A REFERENCE WORK 24 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter Freed,
Computer Technology]; Michael C. Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173 (1981); David A. Hall, Note, Strict Products Liability and
Computer Software: Caveat Vendor, 4 COMPUTER/L.J. 373 (1983); Bonna Lynn Horowitz,
Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out
of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REv. 129 (1985); Susan Lanoue, Comment, Computer
Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439 (1983).
2. Gemignani, supra note 1; Thomas G. Wolpert, Product Liability and Software
Implicated in Personal Injury, 60 DEF. CoUNS. J. 519 (1993).
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Jacquard's loom, and Herman Hollerith's tabulating code developed
for the American census of 1890.'
Although the history of computers and computing becomes
clouded by the security surrounding both the Second World War and
the Cold War that followed, two major developments in 1943 are
generally regarded as the origination of the modem stored program
electronic computer: J. Prosper Eckert and Dr. John W. Mauchly's
(United States) ENIAC 4 design and the design at Bletchley Park
(England)5 of Colossus, the computer that would decode the German
enigma messages.6
Alan Turing, sometimes called the father of computer science,
tied together these two developments, and it was he who considered
the fundamentals of what is now called software fault tolerance. 7
Turing concluded that it was not possible to write a program that
could determine if another program will compute successfully and
halt.8 In other words, the proof of correctness of any program is not
computable, and software fault tolerance does not have a theoretical
basis.
Neither ENIAC nor Colossus were true programmable
computers in the modem sense. The development of magnetic core
computer memories (patented in 1947) led to the move away from
programming done by wiring a physical connection between the parts
of the hardware, towards programming done by storing an easily
altered program in the machine's memory.
The development of the transistor at Bell labs in the late 1940s as
a replacement for unreliable relays 9 started the next phase of
expansion of computers and software into our lives. Before then,
3. The Computer Museum at Bletchley Park, Timeline, at
http://www.retrobeep.com/timeline/timelinelndex.htm (last visited July 14, 2004).
4. Martin H Weik, The ENIAC Story, ORDINANCE, Jan.-Feb. 1961, available at
http://ftp.arl.army.mil/-mike/comphist/eniac-story.html (last visited July 14, 2004).
5. Bletchley Park, Official Homepage, at http://www.bletchleypark.org.uld (last visited
July 14, 2004).
6. Tony Sale, The Colossus Rebuild Project, at
http://www.codesandciphers.org.uk/lorenz/rebuild.htm (last visited July 14, 2004).
7. Marathon Techs. Corp., The History of Fault Tolerance Explained, Real Time Sys.
Ltd. (1998), at http://www.rts2000.demon.co.uk/historyoffaulttolerance.html (last visited July
14, 2004).
8. Id.
9. Lucent Techs., The Transistor-First Uses (2004), at
http://www.lucent.com/minds/transistor/usesl.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005); Lucent Techs.,
The Transistor-The Inventors (2004), at
http://www.lucent.com/minds/transistor/inventors0.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
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electronics mainly relied upon valves' 0 that were used in the logic
circuits of the early computers. Valves require a lot of power,
generate a lot of heat when working correctly, and are fragile.
Transistors,1 on the other hand, require less power, generate less heat
and are more reliable.
It was the work of Jack Kilby12 in the late 1950s when working
for Texas Instruments that led to the idea of creating other
components out of the materials used to construct transistors and
making them into a single package. Thus was born the concept of the
integrated circuit from which Intel in 1969 created the first
microprocessor.13
Since the design of the first microprocessor, subsequent designs
have primarily increased system speeds and system capability while
decreasing costs. It was this growth in power and decrease in costs
that led directly to the microprocessor becoming ubiquitous, powering
an estimated 1,000,000,000 home computers in 2002.1
4
Microprocessors are also found in washing machines and dishwashers
(replacing the previously common clockwork timing mechanisms)
and are found controlling phase-locked loops tuning portable radios,
replacing the previous analogue designs of capacitors and inductors.
Microprocessors with allied circuits have replaced the mechanical
tape mechanism in the answering machine and the mechanical dial of
the telephone. Microprocessors control the engine management,
braking system, airbags, navigation system, radio, cruise control,
four-wheel drive, and even the wiring of cars from all over the
world.15
The use of a generic microprocessor and special software instead
of discrete components wired for a specific purpose has led to a
"throw away" attitude with respect to modem electronics. When it
ceased to be viable to repair the electronic components within modem
10. See ScienCentral, Inc. & The Am. Inst. of Physics, The Vacuum Tube, PBS Online, at
http://www.pbs.org/transistor/science/events/vacuumt.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
11. ScienCentral, Inc. & The American Inst. of Physics, Transistorized!, PBS Online, at
http://www.pbs.org/transistor/albuml/index.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
12. See generally Inventor Jack Kilby, The Great Idea Finder, at
http://www.ideafinder.com/history/inventors/kilby.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (short
biography).
13. Microprocessor Histor,-Invention of the Microprocessor, The Great Idea Finder, at
http://www.ideafinder.com/history/inventions/microprocessor.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
14. Computers Reach One Billion Mark, BBC NEWS, July 1, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/sci/tech/2077986.stm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
15. See, e.g., InfoArt News Agency, Intel Processors Will Power Russian Cars, InfoArt,
at http://scripts.infoart.nuit/news/engnews/99/04/02_405.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
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equipment, it became less expensive to replace the whole item, which
led manufacturers to adopt the attitude that "it will be all right in the
next revision." This attitude has now spread from hardware to
software and might be one of the root causes of failures of some
systems.
Because programs can be written to do things that conventional
components cannot, microprocessors have helped in the creation of
previously impossible new products such as digital cameras, mobile
telephones, pocket computers, portable printers, small GPS receivers,
and CD/DVD players. However, while all these products seem to be
"cutting edge," the processor inside, at the heart of these devices, is
still based upon concepts devised over fifty years ago. Thus, the
technology contained within the product should be considered mature,
not something new.
A. Software Versus Hardware
This history of the computer has concentrated upon the hardware
that makes up the machines. Hardware is the "nuts and bolts"-the
parts of a computer system that you can see, touch, and feel.'
6
Typically hardware either works or it does not; the power supply
gives out twelve volts or it does not, the disk drive spins or it does
not. Hardware can fail for one of two reasons, faulty design or failed
components.1
7
The programs that make the hardware do what the user wants the
hardware to do are collectively called the software.' 8 Software,
supplied to the user by the hardware (disk) on which the software is
recorded, is the computer instructions and data that are stored
electronically within the computer; when the electricity is turned off,
the software ceases to exist.
B. What Is a Software Failure and Why Does Software Fail?
Software can only fail for one reason: faulty design.' 9 While it is
common to call any failure of software to perform as the user
16. See Hardware, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book--Dictionary&va=hardware&x= S&y= 15
(last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (definition).
17. Marathon Techs. Corp., supra note 7.
18. See Software, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=-Dictionary&va=software&x-=15&y 15
(last visited Mar. 3, 2005) (definition).
19. Marathon Techs. Corp., supra note 7.
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expected a bug,2° the real bug is the failure of the software to do what
the programmer who created it thought it was going to do, which is
not quite the same thing. Many reported "bugs" are, in fact, the
correct and expected operation of the hardware and software
combination, but they are not what the end-user expected it to do, so
they may be considered faults, but not failures.
Software systems are products of the human mind and are
vulnerable to programming mistakes. While software can only fail
due to faulty design, these mistakes occur in various forms, including
design inconsistencies, syntax errors, and semantic errors.
In everyday desktop systems, these glitches can result in
inconvenience and frustration, but are not usually particularly serious.
However, even as small an error as a punctuation mistake can cause
major economic loss and mission failure as was seen in the North
American Space Agency's ("NASA") Mariner 1 Venus probe that
launched in 1962, where a missing hyphen caused the spacecraft to
travel off-course. 2'
Newer programming techniques and compilers can mitigate
many semantic and syntactic errors by increasing the amount of
checking done by the compiler over the programming code entered
into it. However, as Turing's proof demonstrated, they cannot test the
complete correctness of any specific program. Unfortunately, tests
cannot prove that there are absolutely no bugs in a program. All they
can do is highlight the existence of the problems they find.
A researcher at NASA, Ames M. Lowry, argued in a report that
the size of software used in space missions has been increasing
exponentially.22 He noted that there are many examples where bugs in
contemporary systems have resulted in mission failure and suggests
that the number of software errors in future systems may similarly
increase, thereby increasing the likelihood of critical faults, which
20. Legend is that in 1946 the term "bug" was first coined to describe an error in the
execution of a computer's program when Grace Hopper was working at the computation
laboratory at Harvard and traced an error to a moth trapped in a relay. The dead insect was
removed from the relay, taped into her logbook, and recorded as the first bug. Rebecca Norman,
Grace Murray Hopper, at http://www.agnesscott.edulriddle/women/hopper.htm (last visited
Mar. 27, 2005) (short biography).
21. NSSDC Master Catalog: Spacecraft, Mariner 1, National Space Science Data Center,
at http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/tmp/MARIN 1.html (last visited July 14, 2004).
22. MICHAEL R. LOWRY, SOFTWARE CONSTRUCTION AND ANALYSIS TOOLS FOR FUTURE
SPACE MISSIONS 3 (2001), available at http://www-etaps.imag.fr/Invited/Lowry-tacas.pdf (last
visited April 14, 2005).
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may "incapacitate safety-critical systems. 23 In the context of the
report, a safety-critical system is defined as one in which a
malfunction could result in death, injury or illness, major economic
24loss, mission failure, environmental damage, or property damage. In
the lEE Review, Les Hatton asserts that the average number of errors
per line of computer code remains fairly constant for different source
languages.25 This is interpreted to mean that the brain of the
programmer has a constant probability of introducing faults. In other
words, doubling the number of lines of code will produce double the
number of programming faults.
C. How Can Software Failure Be Mitigated?
Modem software engineering techniques 26 for creating and
maintaining software applications combine techniques from computer
science, project management, domain knowledge, and other skills and
technologies, including common sense. The practices have evolved
steadily, but it was the supposed software crisis2 7 during the period
from 1960 to 1980 that identified many problems of software
development. During that time, projects were delivered late, went
over budget, and some caused property damage or loss of life.
To combat the problems, a number of tools, including new ways
of working, new processes, and new languages, were all suggested as
solutions. However, in his article "No Silver Bullet,"28 Fred Brooks
argues that there can be no easy answers to software engineering
problems, describing two different types of complexity. Essential
complexity is inherent and nothing can remove it.29 If a word
23. ROBERT DIMOND, ET AL., SURPRISE 2002, SOFTWARE FOR NASA IN 2050: AN
IMPOSSIBLE MISSION? 3 (2002), available at
http://www.matcore.com/surprise/report/ReportFINAL.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2005) (citing
LOWRY, supra note 22).
24. Id.
25. Les Hatton, Software Failures, Follies and Fallacies, 43 lEE REVIEW, Mar. 1997, at
49.
26. See Software Engineering, Wikipedia, at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software-engineering (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (providing a brief
overview of software engineering).
27. See Software Crisis, Wikipedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Softwarecrisis (last
visited Mar. 7, 2005) (providing a brief overview of the software crisis).
28. Frederick P. Brooks, Jr., No Silver Bullet. Essence and Accidents of Software
Engineering, COMPUTER MAG. (Apr. 1987), available at
http://www.virtualschool.edu/mon/SoftwareEngineering/BrooksNoSilverBullet.html (last visited
July 14, 2004).
29. Id.
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processor's spell-checker has to work in 50 different languages, then
it has to work in 50 different languages. In contrast, accidental
complexity is created by programmers and can be dealt with.3 °
The accidental complexity of writing and optimizing machine
code can be dealt with by programming in high-level languages that
require fewer lines of code and have very strong checking routines
that test the operation of module interfaces and help to minimize
syntax and semantic errors. Similarly, using object-oriented
programming methods helps to minimize the number of design
inconsistencies. Note, however, that these changes only deal with the
accidental complexity, not the essential complexity of the problems
that we are trying to solve.
31
Testing for errors is another strategy in preventing erroneous
software from being released to an unsuspecting user.
D. How Is Software Tested?
Typically, during initial testing, software engineers exercise the
instructions to see that they perform as expected. For example, if the
first instruction is "copy the value 2 into register A," does register A
contain the value 2 after the instruction's execution? Or, if you type a
word into the word processor, do the letters appear on the screen?
And, does the spell-checker highlight any misspelling?
Of course, programmers tend to test that their creation does what
they expect it to do. If the original specification was wrong from a
user's perspective, software can pass all its tests and still not meet the
user's needs. Worse, engineers will often test in their environment,
not acting as non-expert users. For example, knowing that the escape
key will exit the debugger, they often do not test what happens when
the end user presses the escape key.
During testing, some instruction paths may never be tested if the
decision choosing that path is never exercised. In addition, within a
single computer, different packages of software are likely to interact.
Many a user has complained, "Everything worked until I installed
xxxxx." Part of the problem is that these are very complex systems.
Teams of individuals who may not see the whole picture write parts
according to their interpretation of a specification they have received.
All these parts must then be integrated into a whole containing
30. Id.
31. Id.
[Vol. 21
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hundreds of different parts created by hundreds of people, all the parts
coming together in one word processor or database.
There are literally hundreds of papers about software testing,
ranging from the simplistic to the mathematically challenging. Most
include the inherent assumption that it is not possible to remove all
the errors from software.
E. Software Incidents-Deadly and Potentially So
The Association for Computing Machinery,32 founded in 1947,
maintains a "forum on the risks to the public in computers and related
systems" called the Risks Digest.33 It is a forum that provides a useful
perspective on the risks associated with computers and software.
Although not a complete database of known problems, a recent digest,
Volume 23 with 45 issues covering the period from 7th November
2003 to I 0h July 2004, contains just fewer than 680 entries of risk to
the public. Items of interest range from the Nuclear Plant shut down
by a lightning strike34 (including a very short description of a
computer failure causing the steam isolation valves to close), the
driver of a Honda CRV trapped in a flood when his electrically driven
windows would not wind down,35 to the two accidents caused when
the braking system of commuter buses was disabled by
electromagnetic interference.36
There are other, deadly or potentially deadly examples. In
February 2000, Ferrari issued a recall for its 360 Modena cars.37 The
reason for the recall was that "[t]he anti-lock braking system
electronic control, under certain heavy braking conditions, may fail,
resulting in the braking action being biased to the rear wheels, which
32. ACM: Ass'n for Computing Mach., Official Homepage, at http://www.acm.org/ (last
visited July 14, 2004) ("[T]he world's first educational and scientific computing society").
33. ACM Comm. on Computers and Pub. Policy, THE RISKS DIG., at
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks (last visited July 14, 2004).
34. ACM Comm. on Computers and Pub. Policy, Nuclear Plan Shut Down by Lightning
Strike, 23 THE RISKS DIG. Issue 5 (Nov. 2003), at
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/23.05.html#subj3 (last visited July 14, 2004).
35. ACM Comm. on Computers and Pub. Policy, Electronic Car Doors Trap Man in
Australian Flood, Nearly Drown Him, 23 THE RISKS DIG. Issue 6 (Dec. 2003), at
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/23.06.html#subj I (last visited July 14, 2004).
36. ACM Comm. on Computers and Pub. Policy, Loss of Bus Braking Due to Nearby
Illegally Modified Transceivers, 23 THE RISKS DIG. Issue 9 (Dec. 2003) at
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/23.09.html#subj2 (last visited April 14, 2005).
37. All About Cars, Vehicle Recalls, Ferrari 360, The AA, at
http://www.theaa.com/allaboutcars/recalls/recalls.jsp?modellD=A5&modelName=360&makeN
ame=Ferrari&makeld=B2 (last visited July 14, 2004).
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may cause instability. 38 The repair was to replace the software in the
anti-lock braking system electronic control unit.39 Then, in April
2001, Ferrari issued another recall for the 360 Modena. 40 This time it
reported that the brake failure warning light might fail to illuminate in
the event of a system failure.4' Again the repair was to update the
software, but this time in the dashboard electronic control unit.
42
Patients treated at the National Cancer Institute in Panama in
November 2000 died after receiving an excessive dose of radiation
from the Cobalt 60 radiotherapy machine.43 An investigation
determined that the cause of the overdose lay in the entering of data
into the computerized treatment planning system.44 The data could be
entered in a number of different ways and when some particular
methods were used, the output values were calculated incorrectly.
45
At the time of the initial radiological emergency notification, twenty-
eight patients had been affected and eight had died.46 The
investigative team confirmed that five of the deaths were probably
attributable to the patient's overexposure to radiation. 47 There was
insufficient information to draw conclusions on two of the others, and
the last one was considered to have died from his cancer.48
In Australia, software failure was found to have contributed to a
fatal road accident. A baby boy was killed when a truck with
defective brakes carrying compacted excavated clay crashed into the
back of a car in which he was riding.49 A glitch in the Roads and
Traffic Authority software system had allowed the driver to reregister
the truck without an inspection a month before the accident .5
In March 2003, a Royal Air Force Tornado 51 supersonic attack
aircraft was struck by a missile fired by a USA "Patriot" air missile
38. Id
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Radiological Accident at National Oncology Institute in Panama, The Society for
Radiological Protection, June 9, 2001, at http://www.srp-uk.org/servpanama.html.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Loma Knowles, Triple Truck Speed Led to Death of Baby Scott - RTA 'Glitch' Let
Truckie Re-register Unsuspected Vehicle, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Feb. 25, 2003, at 9.
50. Id.
51. Tornado GR4, The Royal Air Force, at
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defense system resulting in the deaths of two flight lieutenants. 2 In
May 2004, the United Kingdom defense minister admitted that the
Tornado software failed to identify itself as friendly and was then
classified as an enemy rocket by the Patriot battery, which promptly
shot it down.53 An earlier BBC report had stated that the Patriot
software had been identifying friendly aircraft as tactical ballistic
missiles many times a day despite the fact that ballistic missiles travel
at higher altitudes, on a predictable ascending or descending
trajectory, and at higher speeds.54
When purchasing a computer it is common for the original
hardware to come from one supplier, the firmware from a second
supplier, and the installed operating system from the third supplier
using configuration (system settings) from yet a fourth supplier. Add
extra hardware, e.g., a Network card, from a second hardware supplier
that alters firmware settings and uses drivers from yet another party.
The drivers alter the way the operating system works and interacts
with all other hardware; the new hardware itself interacts directly with
the extant hardware. The hardware, firmware, and software were all
designed, built, and tested by humans who are fallible. The original
specification was created by a human as were the manuals for the end
users. Failure at any stage can result in the aspirations of the user not
being met. When dashed expectations also lead to injury and death, it
is almost impossible for the injured party to pinpoint exactly what
went wrong and who is responsible. Strict liability is seemingly
appropriate for these very reasons.
III. THE LITERATURE ON SOFTWARE LIABILITY
Early commentators recognized the prospect of computers and
software insinuating themselves into modem day life and the
corresponding liability for damage caused by the new technology.5
They pondered the circumstance of physical injury and whether strict
liability would apply.5 6 The drumbeat has not ceased. There are still
ample examples in the literature of commentators considering the
http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/tornado-at.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
52. 'System Error'Link to RAF Deaths, BBC NEWS, May 14,2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/england/norfolk/3714251.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
53. Id.
54. 'Missile Error'Led to RAF Deaths, BBC NEWS, Apr. 9, 2004, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/3613319.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
55. See supra note 1.
56. See supra note 1.
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liability regime for defects in computer software and hardware.5 7
Some of these commentators carefully track the emerging case law
involving computers.58 Not surprisingly, opinions among early and
more recent commentators are split on whether strict liability is
appropriate, or even necessary. Those who favor a strict liability
regime generally do so based on the policies underlying the
doctrine. 59 Those who oppose such a development cite concerns about
stifling innovation,60 cost,61 stunting the growth of the industry, 62 and
the possibility that beneficial products would become unavailable or
would never be developed in the first place63 if strict liability were to
apply to software. We align with those who favor the adoption of
strict liability. We do so for the policy reasons articulated by others,
and also because we find that the industry is in a position to and
should be made to absorb the cost of harm occasioned by defects.
IV. THE CASE LAW
The case law with respect to liability for software defects is large
and growing. As always with the development of case law in an
57. Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability Theory in
Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87 CAL. L. REV. 269 (1999); David W. Lannetti, Toward a
Revised Definition of "Product" Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 55
Bus. LAW. 799 (2000); R.L. Mays, Jr., Patent No. 6,035,321--Opening the Door to Software
Product Liability Exposure, 6 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 197 (2001); Douglas E. Phillips, When
Software Fails: Emerging Standards of Vendor Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
50 Bus. LAW. 151 (1994); Robert D. Sprague, Software Products Liability: Has Its Time
Arrived?, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 137 (1991); J.P. Thurston, Liability, 4 COMPUTER L. & PRAc. 80
(1988); Wolpert, supra note 2; Brian H. Lamkin, Comment Medical Expert Systems and
Publisher Liability: A Cross-Contextual Analysis, 43 EMoRY L.J. 731 (1994); Michael R.
Maule, Comment, Applying Strict Products Liability to Computer Software, 27 TULSA L.J. 735
(1992); Patrick T. Miyaki, Comment, Computer Software Defects: Should Computer Software
Manufacturers Be Held Strictly Liable for Computer Software Defects?, 8 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 121 (1992); Daniel T. Perlman, Note, Who Pays the Price of
Computer Software Failure?, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 383 (1998); Julia A. Tyde,
Comment, Medical Computer Software.: Rxfor Deadly Errors, 4 SOFTWARE L.J. 117 (1990);
Lori A. Weber, Note, Bad Bytes: The Application of Strict Products Liability to Computer
Software, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 469 (1992).
58. Noriko Kawawa, Comparative Studies on the Law of Tort Relating to Liability for
Injury Caused by Information in Traditional and in Electronic Form: England and the United
States, 12 ALB. L.J. SC. & TECH. 493 (2002); Sprague, supra note 57; Lamkin, supra note 57;
Miyaki, supra note 57; Perlman, supra note 57; Weber, supra note 57.
59. Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1; Genignani, supra note l; Sprague, supra note
57; Hall, supra note 1; Lanoue, supra note 1.
60. Lamkin, supra note 57; Miyaki, supra note 57.
61. Miyaki, supra note 57; Weber, supra note 57.
62. Freed, Computer Age, supra note I.
63. Weber, supra note 57.
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emerging field, the body of law is evolving slowly and incrementally.
Also, as is typical, courts reason by analogy from known concepts
and are applying historic principles to the more modem context of
software.
Our reading of the cases throughout the years suggests eras into
which the cases can be categorized. There are what we call precursor
cases that do not involve software per se, but involve new or
technology-based manufactured goods or simply set the stage for the
upcoming software cases. On some level, all product liability cases
could be considered precursor cases, but we confine ourselves to
those that foretell the debate about strict liability for software. Next is
the era in which the main issue is whether software is a good for
purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and a product
for product liability generally. The intangible nature of software and
the argument that it is really a service, not a good, dominate these
cases. There is also a category of cases questioning whether a sale
occurs when the buyer and seller identify their transaction as a
license. Even when software is considered a tangible product and the
transaction that transfers it is considered a sale, there are still
questions about whether all liability regimes associated with the law
of product liability-negligence, breach of warranty, and strict
liability-should be brought to bear.
Early cases involved economic loss only as hardware and
software malfunctioned and caused disappointment to the buyer, not
physical injury. Because of the economic loss doctrine, 64 breach of
warranty was considered the appropriate and only claim.65 Within a
breach of warranty regime, concepts such as disclaimers and
limitations of warranties and remedies became important.
Manufacturers and sellers quickly learned to include language in the
contract of sale limiting their liability and damages for defects, as is
permitted by the UCC.
6 6
Even those cases that applied a negligence standard considered
whether regular negligence principles should be applied or whether
there should be a heightened standard of liability normally associated
with professionals-a so-called programmer malpractice standard.
64. The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created principle that requires parties to
live by their contracts rather than pursue tort actions for purely economic or commercial losses
arising out of a contract. See Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 677 N.W.2d 233, 241 (Wis.
2004). It is designed in part to maintain the fundamental distinction between tort and contract
law. Id. at 242.
65. See infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text.
66. U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719 (1972).
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While this era is largely over, given the lack of professional standards
in the industry, the question did occupy courts and commentators
alike.67
Finally, there are the misrepresentation cases. In their enthusiasm
to sell the new technology, sellers sometimes made assertions about
the capabilities of their products that turned out not to be true.6 8 When
the promises were not fulfilled, disappointed buyers brought claims in
misrepresentation. In so doing, they were often able to ignore the
contractual limitations in the contract of sale that would have
precluded or severely limited recovery.69
A. The Precursor Cases
The stage for software liability cases was set with The T.J
Hooper case.70 The case involved a barge collision during a storm.71
The tug boats towing the barges were not equipped with radios that
could have alerted the captains to the fast-moving storm.72 While
radios were not required on tugs at that time, nor even widely
adopted, the court nevertheless held that the lack of a radio was
negligent: 73 "Courts must in the end say what is required; there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not
excuse their omission. 74 The T.J. Hooper case is a technology-
forcing case. The court was not willing to let industry custom set the
standard of prudence when radio technology existed and was
reasonably reliable and affordable, 75 although not widely adopted.
The connection to software failure is clear. The software industry
alone should not be permitted to set the standard for software quality
lest it set the standard too low.
There are also the "book cases," a series of cases that held that
information in a book is not a product for product liability purposes.
These cases involve faulty information in books that, when acted
67. See, e.g., Gemignani, supra note 1; Perlman, supra note 57.
68. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971);
Dacotah Mktg. & Research, L.L.C. v. Versatility, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 570 (E.D. Va. 1998);
Accusystems, Inc. v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 474 (S.D.N.Y 1984).
69. See, e.g., Clements Auto Co., 444 F.2d at 169; Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v.
Prophet 21, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 826 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Accusystems, Inc., 580 F. Supp. at 474.
70. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 740.
74. Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
75. Id.
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upon by the reader, produced harm. Probably the most famous is
Winter v. G. P. Putnam's Sons.7 6 The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms,
written by others and published by the defendant, contained erroneous
information about the edibility of a particular mushroom.77 Relying
on the information, the plaintiffs ate what was actually a poisonous
mushroom and became critically ill.7 8 They sued the publisher under a
number of theories, including strict liability. 79 The court held, among
other things, that although the book itself was a product, the
information in the book was not a product for product liability
purposes. 80 However, in an interesting bit of dicta, the court imagines
that "[c]omputer software that fails to yield the result for which it was
designed" may be treated as a product, 81 and thus be subject to
product liability law.
Other book cases include a chemistry text that misstated the
steps of a chemistry experiment and caused injury to a student,82 a
recipe book that did not mention that an ingredient is toxic when
eaten raw,83 and a how-to book on tool construction that likewise
produced injury.84 In each of these "book cases," the courts refused to
apply strict liability to the information in the book. In addition to the
reluctance to categorize information as a product, the courts were also
concerned about First Amendment issues and chilling expression if
they were to expose distributors of books to the heightened standard
of strict liability.86 The question then becomes whether information in
a computer program is analogous to information in a book. We
argue87 that software is not information in the same way that the
content of books are information because of its functionality and that
76. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
77. Id. at 1034.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Id. at 1036.
81. Id.
82. Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S. 2d 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
83. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
84. Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold, Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
85. Walter, 439 N.Y.S. 2d at 822.
86. See, e.g., Winter v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1991); see
also Andrew T. Bayman, Strict Liability for Defective Ideas in Publications, 42 VAND. L. REV.
557 (1989); Jonathan B. Mintz, Strict Liability for Commercial Intellect, 41 CATH. U. L. REv.
617(1992).
87. See infra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
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First Amendment concerns are not pressing when considering
software as opposed to literature.
88
In contrast to the book cases, but still within the precursor case
category, are the "aeronautical charts" cases. The information on the
charts can be analogized to the information in books. However, the
courts that have considered the charts cases routinely hold that the
charts are products for purposes of product liability and that strict
liability can be applied. We detail these cases because we believe that
they provide the best analogy to software and the fullest analysis and
supporting arguments for why software should be subjected to strict
liability. In Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co.,89 the
Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court's finding that the charts in
question were defectively designed.90 The defendant, Jeppeson & Co.,
translated tabular data supplied by the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") and represented it graphically on charts used
by pilots.91 In Aetna, the flight crew was using two charts to
undertake an instrument approach into the airport. 92 Unfortunately,
the charts, showing different views of the approach, while accurate,
were drawn to different scales and the plane crashed. 93 According to
the court, "[t]he 'defect' in the chart consists of the fact that the
graphic depiction of [one chart], which covers a distance of three
miles from the airport, appears to be drawn to the same scale as the
graphic depiction of [the other chart], which covers a distance of 15
miles."94 The court did not engage in a thorough analysis of whether
the chart was a product. Rather, it simply held that the difference in
scale and the conflict created by the numbers on the charts and the
graphic representation of those numbers "rendered the chart
defective." 95 Indeed, the court's use of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, § 402A and case law that seemed to take on a strict liability
approach,96 makes for a reasonable case that the court adopted a strict
product liability standard.
88. See infra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
89. 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
90. Id. at 342-43.
91. Id. at 341-42.
92. Id. at 342.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 642 F.2d at 342.
96. Id. at 343.
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In Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 97 a faulty chart was again
responsible for an airline crash. The case went to the jury on all three
theories of product liability: negligence, breach of warranty, and strict
liability.9 8 The jury ultimately found Jeppesen liable on all three
theories and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. 99 In affirming
the lower court the Second Circuit held:
We believe that the trial court did not err in classifying appellant's
charts as products. The charts, as produced by Jeppesen...
reached [the pilot] without any individual tailoring or substantial
change in contents-they were simply mass-produced. The
comments to § 402A, supra, envision strict liability against sellers
of such items in these circumstances. By publishing and selling the
charts, Jeppesen undertook a special responsibility, as seller, to
insure that consumers will not be injured by the use of the charts;
Jeppesen is entitled-and encouraged-to treat the burden of
accidental injury as a cost of production to be covered by liability
insurance. This special responsibility lies upon Jeppesen in its role
as designer, seller, and manufacturer.
Appellant's position that its navigational charts provide no more
than a service ignores the mass-production aspect of the charts.
Though a "product" may not include mere provision of
architectural design plans or any similar form of data supplied
under individually-tailored service arrangements, the mass
production and marketing of these charts requires Jeppesen to bear
the costs of accidents that are proximately caused by defects in the
charts. 10
In Brocklesby v. United States,'01 the court took head-on the
question of whether the aeronautical charts were products for
purposes of strict liability. In this case the Jeppesen chart accurately
portrayed an instrument approach procedure provided by the FAA.
10 2
The defects in the chart were a result of the FAA's faulty
procedure.10 3 Naturally, Jeppesen argued that it should not be held
liable for a problem caused by the government. 1°4 The court pointed
out that strict liability does not depend on fault and that, according to
97. 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
98. Id. at 673.
99. Id. at 674.
100. Id. at 676-77 (citations omitted).
101. 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 1295.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the Restatement (Second) of Torts,105 sellers are strictly liable for
injuries caused by a defective product even if they have exercised all
possible care. 10 6 In response to Jeppesen's claim that it is unfair to
hold the company strictly liable for republishing the government's
information, the court said:
Jeppesen's charts are more than just a republication of the text of
the government's procedures. Jeppesen converts a government
procedure from text into graphic form and represents that the chart
contains all necessary information .... It is true that the
government's procedures are significant components of Jeppesen's
charts. It is apparent, however, that Jeppesen's charts are more
than a mere republication of the government's procedures. Indeed,
Jeppesen's charts are distinct products. As a manufacturer and
marketer of those products Jeppesen assumed the responsibility for
insuring that the charts are not unreasonably dangerous in their
intended use. °7
Finally, in Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co.,108 a California state
court reached a similar result as the previous cases. It cited with
approval the previous aeronautical chart cases, saying that they were
"entirely consistent with the fundamental policies which underlie the
strict product liability doctrine in this state." 109 In considering whether
a chart is a product for purposes of strict liability, the court held that
"characterizing respondent's instrument approach charts as 'products'
serves '[the] paramount policy to be promoted by the [doctrine],' i.e.,
'the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing
defects and the spreading throughout society of the cost of
compensating them."' 1 10 The trial court had refused to give the jury a
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
106. Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1296.
107. Id. at 1298.
108. 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
109. Id. at 70-71.
110. Id. at 71 (citing Campbell v. Gen. Motors Corp., 649 P.2d 224 (Cal. 1982)).
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strict liability instruction because the chart was not a product 1 and
that decision was reversed.'
1 2
The aeronautical charts cases provide a more perfect analogy to
software than the book cases for a number of reasons. First, the charts
are functional and not literary. There can be no purpose for
aeronautical charts other than their function to aid pilots. Similarly,
software has no purpose other than to cause a computer to perform
some function. While it is true that the how-to books, such as recipe
books, and mushroom hunting books are functional, they are a small
subset of all books, which leads to the second argument. In the book
cases, the courts expressed concerns that subjecting the information in
the books to strict liability may chill free expression. In the case of
aeronautical charts, free expression is not a desired quality. The
information contained in the charts must be factual and accurate.
There is no opportunity for literary license, political statement, or
artistic expression. The same is true for software. The program must
be accurate, and it must work. Indeed, in Winter, an early book case,
the court opined that its holding that the book was a product but the
information contained within the book was not, would not apply in
the case of software. 1 3 The argument that subjecting information
contained in books to strict liability has significant First Amendment
implications is really a slippery slope argument. Even though the
how-to books are functional, to hold in those instances that the
information is a product sets the stage for holding all information in
all books to that high standard. In other words, it is a short step to
imposing that standard on all books, including literary and political
tomes, and thus seriously implicating the First Amendment. A similar
concern does not exist with respect to software. Like aeronautical
charts, software is only functional and not literary or political. While
it has been held that software enjoys some modicum of First
Amendment protection, it is not the strict scrutiny standard that most
literary expression enjoys.' 1 4 Therefore, to subject defective software
(i.e., software that does not function properly and causes injury) to
strict liability does not risk opening up a universe of other software
that is purely expressive to similar scrutiny as it does in the book
cases. Therefore, we find that the aeronautical charts cases more
111. Id.
112. Id.at75.
113. Winter v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991).
114. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449-52 (2d Cir. 2001).
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nearly model the arguments for applying strict liability to defective
software than do the book cases.
B. The Breach of Warranty Cases
Because almost all software cases to date involve purely
economic loss, contract principles apply. Typically in these cases,
sellers have attempted to limit their liability through contract either by
disclaiming warranties, employing merger clauses, or limiting
remedies. 
115
Courts have taken a number of approaches when faced with
these cases. They may simply enforce the contract as written,
complete with all its disclaimers, and deny recovery to the plaintiff.
They may move outside the contract to find other bases for finding
liability. Or, they may simply ignore the contract because it is
unconscionable or is invalid for other reasons. Naturally, the approach
taken depends heavily on the facts of each case and the existing case
law in the jurisdiction.
Very early software cases involved large business systems that
were typically custom-made, or at least customized, for the
customer. 116 The contract was usually a product of face-to-face
negotiations between the contracting parties and included training and
service in addition to the system itself. In other words, the parties
were often in a more equivalent bargaining position' 17-at least as to
economic power, if not knowledge about the product-than one
would find in a consumer contract. Nevertheless, even in the early
cases, courts oftentimes strained to find a remedy that a strict reading
of the contract would not seem to permit.'
1 8
115. See Phillips, supra note 57.
116. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Indus. Supply Corp., 337 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1964); Carl Beasley
Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Sec. Leasing Co. v. Flinco,
Inc., 461 P.2d 460 (Utah 1969); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex.
App. 1979).
117. See Chatlos Sys., Inc., 635 F.2d at 1087 ("[W]e find no great disparity in the parties'
bargaining power or sophistication.").
118. See Sperry Rand Corp., 337 F.2d at 371 (stating that integration clause in contract
does not preclude establishing implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose); Carl Beasley
Ford, 361 F. Supp. at 325 (rejecting the claim that written limitation on consequential damages
does not overcome oral agreement for programming); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register
Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), remedy modified, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating
that additional damages may be appropriate even though written contract limits); WR. Weaver
Co., 580 S.W.2d at 76 (finding the limitation of warranties to be valid, but stating that there may
have been express warranties in statement of installation conditions). But see Sec. Leasing Co.,
461 P.2d at 460 (finding an integration clause effectively eliminated any chance to introduce
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More modem warranty cases are similarly inconsistent. Some
cases do not apparently involve any limitations and disclaimers and
the courts simply award a contract remedy when the software fails to
perform." 9 In those cases where a limitation provision is present,
some cases uphold the contractual limitations and deny recovery.1
20
There are also cases that find other ways for the purchaser to recover,
even though a limitation provision would dictate a different result.'
2
'
Note that all the warranty cases rely on the UCC for their
outcomes. Either tacitly or explicitly the courts have determined that
software is in fact a good for UCC purposes 122 and the license
agreement that transfers the software from buyer to seller is a
other evidence). It should be noted that these cases involve the U.C.C. and thus the courts were
treating software as a good.
119. See, e.g., Latham & Assoc., Inc. v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., No. 22 90 46,
1990 Conn. Super. LEXIS 688 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 10, 1990); Italo v. Monteleone, No. 83C-
DE-70, 1986 Del. Super. LEXIS 1222 (Del. Super Ct. May 27, 1986); Winterbotham v.
Computer Corps, Inc., 490 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Carbur's, Inc. v. A & S
Office Concepts, Inc., 445 A.2d 1109 (N.H. 1982).
120. See, e.g., Lucre, Inc. v. ADC Telecomms., Inc., No. 1:02-CV-343, 2002 U.S. Dis.
LEXIS 15421, at *14-15 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2002) (holding that the limitation of liability is
not unconscionable); Brown v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 98-507-SLR, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15525
(D. Del. Sept. 13, 1999) (holding that the software agreement limiting consequential damages is
not unconscionable and thus controls); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (holding that the initial purchase of software is governed by licensing
agreement that disclaimed warranties, although subsequent purchases do not indicate acceptance
of original terms); Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Protech Plumbing & Heating, Inc., No. A03-8 10,
2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 191 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2004) (holding that there is a conspicuous
disclaimer); Noble Thread Corp. v. Vormittag Assocs., Inc., 758 N.Y.S.2d 509 (N.Y. App. Div.
2003) (holding that the limitations are clear and unambiguous and not unconscionable); M.A.
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000) (holding that the
limitations in licensing agreement are not unconscionable).
121. See, e.g., RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting
award of consequential damages even though the contract limited damages because the
limitation failed in its essential purpose); Clements Auto Co. v. Serv. Bureau Corp., 444 F.2d
169 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding the warranty disclaimer to be valid but finding that the plaintiff had
a cause of action for misrepresentation); Amsan, L.L.C. v. Prophet 21, Inc., No. 01-1950, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16698 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2001) (finding that the limitation failed in its
essential purpose); Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Prophet 21, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 826
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (finding that the licensing agreement limits liability, but fraud claim is
actionable); David Cooper, Inc. v. Contemporary Computer Sys., Inc., 846 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993) (finding that the provision requiring return of software within 90 days was not an
exclusive remedy and that the buyer had a reasonable amount of time to determine if goods were
defective).
122. See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir.
1998); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3rd Cir. 1991); RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-
Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Softman Prod. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d
1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Newcourt Fin. USA, Inc. v. FT Mortgage Co., 161 F. Supp. 2d 894
(N.D. 111. 2001).
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"sale.' ' 123 Commentators have addressed in depth the issue of whether
software is a good 124 and whether a license is a sale, 125 but the courts
spend very little time, if any, debating the concepts. We will take their
lead and similarly limit our discussion of these two points.
C. Cases Foretelling Strict Liability for Software
To date, there have been no reported cases holding a software
manufacturer strictly liable for defects in the software. There are a
few cases worthy of mentioning though because they may be
harbingers of cases to come.
LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co. 126 is an early case refusing to
apply strict liability to a supplier of radioactive pellets after
employees who handled the pellets fell ill. Strict product liability was
still in its infancy in 1968, and the reasons the court gave for not
applying strict liability are instructive. The court pointed to three
conditions that made strict liability inappropriate: the small market for
the product, the fact that the market was highly specialized, and the
fact that only a small group was affected. 127 Obviously the court was
considering strict liability to be applicable in a mass-market context.
It is curious to ponder whether the case would yield a similar result
today after forty years of experience with strict liability and its
policies.
In General Motors Corp. v. Johnston, an Alabama case, 128 a chip
in a fuel delivery system of a Chevrolet truck was alleged to be faulty
after it caused a fatal crash. The case was brought under the Alabama
Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine, and the jury awarded
compensatory damages and punitive damages. 29 Although this was
not a strict liability case, it is an example of the dire consequences and
subsequent litigation that can ensue when software fails.
123. See, e.g., I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D.
Mass. 2002); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536 (N.D. Okla. 1997);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
124. See, e.g., Brannigan & Dayhoff, supra note 1; Deborah Kemp, Mass Marketed
Software: The Legality of the Form License Agreement, 48 LA. L. REV. 87 (1987); Phillips,
supra note 57; Horovitz, supra note 1; Lee Kissman, Comment, Revised Article 2 and Mixed
Goods/Information Transactions: Implications for Courts, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 561
(2004); Lanoue, supra note 1.
125. See, e.g., Kemp, supra note 124.
126. 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
127. Id at 943.
128. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So. 2d 1054 (Ala. 1992).
129. Id. at 1056-57.
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There is a second group of cases that never came to a full
determination because they were settled. In one case, as told by one
commentator, radiation patients received overdoses of radiation due
to a software bug in the accelerator that administered the doses.1
30
Two patients died and several others sustained serious injuries.'31 The
estate of one of the deceased patients filed a lawsuit against the
manufacturer of the accelerator and the cancer center where the
patient received his treatments. 132 The complaint alleged that the
product was defective and unreasonably dangerous and not fit for its
intended use. 133 In other words, the claim was brought in strict
liability. The case was eventually settled for an undisclosed amount of
money. 
34
Another dispute arose when a device that allowed patients to
self-administer pain medication after surgery apparently
malfunctioned and caused a patient to overdose on Demerol. 135 The
source of the malfunction was never formally determined because the
case was settled, but it was presumed to be defective software. 136 The
case was brought in strict liability, 37 but there is no formal outcome
because of the settlement.
There are also news accounts of incidents that implicate faulty
software, although the litigation has not come to trial.' 38 In the fall of
2004, Medtronic, Inc. undertook a voluntary recall of software
application cards for one of its medical products in the face of reports
of patient injury and death. 3 9 This means that the stage is set for the
courts to take head-on the question of whether the soft landing the
software industry enjoys should come to an end.
130. E.g., Tyde, supra note 57, at 136. Other commentators mention these cases, but Tyde
provides the most complete narrative.
131. Id. at 137.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 137-38.
136. Tyde, supra note 57, at 138.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
139. See Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, URGENT: Medtronic
Announces Nationwide, Voluntary Recall of Model 8870 Software Application Card (Sept. 22,
2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/recalls/recall-082404b-pressrelease.html. The
company reported seven serious injuries and two deaths associated with the product. See
Medtronic: Company Announces Voluntary Recall of Software Application Card, MED. & LAW
WKLY., Oct. 22, 2004, at 191.
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V. THE STRICT LIABILITY PARADIGM
The case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc 140 is a case
of great notoriety for its holding that "[a] manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it
is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being."' 41 The case is important because
it ushered in a new era of product liability. No longer were plaintiffs
put to the proof of actual negligence on the part of the manufacturer.
No longer were contractual limitations on warranties and damages
binding on the injured party. Strict liability placed the emphasis on
the product itself and not on the conduct of the manufacturer and
other players in the supply chain. The case signifies the recognition of
what the consumer product market had become-mass-marketing of
goods that were becoming ever more sophisticated and out of the ken
of non-expert consumers; complicated chains of distribution that
moved the product from producer to end user; a growing recognition
that product-related injuries were heaping social costs onto the injured
parties and the public at large.' 42 The policy reasons underlying the
doctrine are perhaps the most significant for purposes of this article.
The Greenman court concluded that manufacturers were in the best
position to prevent defects (and thus the injuries occasioned by them)
and that the cost of the heightened liability could be spread across
many products. 143 There is no question that strict liability ups the
stakes for those who produce and sell products, but it is considered an
appropriate measure of liability purely on public policy grounds.
The adoption of strict product liability was a quantum leap in
product liability law. The conditions of its application include a defect
in the product that causes injury to persons or property. 44 Its context
is typically, but not limited to, mass-marketed goods, 45 a significant
propensity for harm if the product is defective, an injured consumer
who has no bargaining power to negotiate a deal with the
manufacturer or seller different from the rest of the buying public, and
a large disparity in knowledge about the product's technology
140. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
141. ld. at 900.
142. Id.
143. Id. at901.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A (1965).
145. By mass-marketed goods, we mean goods that are typically non-customized
consumer products that are purchased off-the-shelf by consumers without expertise in the
product's technology and with no or limited opportunity to inspect the product.
NO MORE SOFT LANDINGS FOR SOFTWARE
between the manufacturer and affected party. 146 These are precisely
the conditions we find in today's software market. Consider, for
example, the software-driven aspects of an automobile, which include
the braking system, the fuel injection system, the electronic ignition
system, and the airbags. A defect in any one of those software
systems can easily result in significant physical injury or death. The
software exists in all models of the automobile-the sale of which is
governed by a standard contract. The consumer lacks knowledge
about or is possibly unaware that software controls some aspects of
the car's operation. The consequences, however, can be dire to the
consumer if the software fails. Failure of the braking system or any of
the engine management systems means that the driver loses control of
the car. Air bags that fail to deploy or deploy when they should not
cause injuries that would not have occurred but for the failure.
Admittedly, software embedded in medical equipment, airplanes,
and air traffic control systems and used to monitor nuclear power
plants is not mass-marketed in the same way that automobiles and
other consumer products are, but the conditions that evoke strict
liability remain the same. The consumer is unaware of and
unknowledgeable about its workings. The consumer is not a party to
the sale and consequently has no ability to negotiate the allocation of
liability if something should go wrong. The likelihood of grave injury
caused by a defect is significant. Thus, it would seem appropriate to
apply strict liability to the context of software defects in these cases as
well. There are some additional reasons specific to the software
industry that compel the application of strict liability. First, to do so
will remove the incentive to put "buggy software" on the market.
There are those who claim that there is no such thing as "bug-free
software."' 147 They argue that the sheer complexity of the product,
which frequently contains millions of lines of code, means that no
amount of testing can determine every permutation of the program
and whether it will operate as planned in all combinations. 148 Critics
nevertheless believe that software is sometimes rushed to the market
to gain competitive advantage and in the hope that users will find the
bugs and report them so they can be corrected in subsequent releases
of the product. 149 In other words, the public release of the product is,
146. LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
147. Freed, Computer Age, supra note 1, at 275; Gemignani, supra note 1, at 195.
148. See, e.g., Gemignani, supra note 1 at 185.
149. See Kevin Coughlin, Math Wizards Ask What's Bugging Computers, NEWIOUSE
NEWS SERV., June 9, 2004.
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in effect, one big beta test of its capabilities. Presumably software that
can cause serious injury and death is not marketed so cavalierly.
However, it is indicative of what can happen when manufacturers are
held to a mere negligence standard of liability. The basic premise that
software inevitably contains bugs dictates the application of strict
liability for two reasons.
First, when tragic consequences occur, the doctrine relieves the
plaintiff from having to prove negligence. In a program that contains
millions of lines of code, it may be that the presence of a few bugs
will not qualify as negligence and relieve the producer of liability for
any injuries. On the other hand, a strict liability standard increases the
liability ex ante and will give the producer pause when selecting and
running tests on the software. Perhaps a few tests are not enough if
more testing can tease out the defects that lie latent in the program.
That is precisely the idea behind strict liability: Increase the
incentives to manufacture and distribute a product without defects
that cause harm.
Second, software manufacturers gain a benefit from putting their
products into the stream of commerce and employ intellectual
property concepts to assert a monopoly over their wares. Software canbe protected by patent5 ° and copyright,'51 and the assertion of these
rights means that the manufacturer is the sole market participant for
that particular product. While other product manufacturers can and do
use primarily patent law to protect their products, the situation is
slightly different. Many consumer products do not depend on a notion
of compatibility. One co-worker can own a Ford and another may
own a Toyota, without any implications whatsoever. Those same two
co-workers, however, will need their office software to be compatible
in order to do their jobs. Only Microsoft produces Windows and, if
that is the platform the office supports, everyone in the office will
have to be a Windows user or risk not having the appropriate and
necessary technical support. More related to our situation is the
following situation. If a hospital employs a medical monitoring
system in the intensive care unit, every patient in the unit will be
monitored by the same system. It would be chaos to have multiple
systems employed in the same hospital. Compatibility and familiarity
with one system are essential to quality care. Even if competitors
create similar non-infringing products, they will not easily find a
market where another system is in place. Thus, the monopoly created
150. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
151. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
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by intellectual property laws combined with the high compatibility
need in most settings virtually assures that software manufacturers
can stave off competition and benefit from their rarified position in
the market in ways their counterparts in other industries cannot. Strict
liability for defective products seems to be a small price to pay for the
benefits reaped in such a marketplace.
We are not unmindful of the arguments against strict liability
generally and as it applies to software in particular. Of course there
are increased costs that accompany increased liability. These are costs
associated with enhanced testing, defending a claim for damages, the
actual payment of damages or settlement, and the cost of liability
insurance. These are costs that are borne by all other manufacturers
who then calculate those costs into the price of the product. It is
anomalous to segregate software for different treatment when that
industry shares similar characteristics with those manufacturers that
bear strict liability. The products of the software industry have as
much capacity to do harm as the products of all other industries, yet
they do not face the same liability exposure. If one considers that the
cost of software-particularly mass-marketed software-is going
down and not up, 152 it does not seem unduly burdensome to impose
these added costs on the manufacturer, who, as Greenman noted over
forty years ago, has the ability to build the increased cost into theprice. 153
We are unmoved by the argument that imposing strict liability
will stifle innovation, especially because we are focusing on a
segment of the industry-software that foreseeably causes physical
harm when defective-rather than the entire software industry. That
has certainly not been the case in other industries subject to strict
liability standards. We know of no special characteristic of the
software industry that would cause a stifling effect to happen there. In
fact, Professor Samuelson characterizes the software industry as one
of rapid innovation and strong competition.154 She says it is evidence
that the software market is vibrant and successful.'55 Those are
precisely the reasons that the stifling effect-if there is one at all-
will not occur. We contend that a vibrant and successful market
characterized by strong competition will be able to adjust to the new
152. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2376 (1994).
153. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
154. Samuelson et al., supra note 152, at 2378.
155. Id.
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liability regime. The industry has the resources and the depth of
experience to continue innovating in that environment because the
market will continue to reward innovation, even in the face of strict
liability, as it has in other industries.
156
These same conditions vitiate the argument that the imposition
of strict liability would stunt the growth of the industry.'57 The
software industry is no longer in its infancy. It has grown by leaps and
bounds and is now a major player in the economy. All the conditions
are in place that will allow continued growth of the industry. Software
is ubiquitous in commercial and consumer life as public acceptance of
and need for software products increase. The market will surely
demand that more software applications be invented and
commercialized. We express no opinion about whether the imposition
of strict liability would have stunted the growth of the industry in its
infancy. However, we are not persuaded that such a move will have a
similar effect now that the industry is such an important component of
the economy. We return again to the point that a similar fate has not
been visited on other product manufacturers whose products
foreseeably cause harm when defective, and we see no evidence to
indicate that the software industry differs in any way that would cause
a different result.
More troubling perhaps is the argument that fears of heavy
liability exposure will keep beneficial products out of the market. 5
We are unaware of any specific instances of software not being
developed or non-defective software being pulled from the market
because of this fear; however, we know the allegation has been made
with respect to other products such as vaccines and aircraft.' 59  If
software can help relieve suffering and enhance the quality of life, we
would want to create an environment where its development can
flourish. By the same token, if the harm that defective software causes
outweighs the benefits sought, it is right and fitting that it be driven
from the market. We trust the case law to make that determination.
Courts have long and rich experience with considering the social
benefits of products and conduct and calibrating the incentives where
156. See, e.g., Maria Papadakis et al., Strict Liability and Consumer Product Innovation:
Results from a Cross-industry Pilot Study, 12 INTERN'L J. TECH. MGMT. 324 (1996) (finding
that the introduction of a strict liability regime in the European Union was a factor but not a
prime motivator of innovation and was a positive influence on some types of innovation).
157. See Freed, Computer Age, supra note 1.
158. See Webersupra note 57.
159. Frances E. Zollers et al., Looking Backward, Looking Forward: Reflections on
Twenty Years of Product Liability Reform, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1019, 1028-32 (2000).
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social benefit will be maximized. Moreover, courts' experience with
crafting the contours of strict liability is similarly extensive.
Consequently, we favor an approach that accepts strict product
liability for software and lets the case law find the point of maximum
social benefit through the application of a rigorous cost/benefit
analysis. In the rare case where a beneficial software product is being
kept out of the market because of liability concerns and that claim is
corroborated, there are a number of public policy strategies that can
be employed in mitigation. For example, there is federal legislation
limiting vaccine manufacturers' liability for certain vaccines. 160 The
legislation was thought necessary after manufacturers threatened to
withdraw life-saving vaccines from the market in the wake of product
liability verdicts. 161 More recently, a federal law has been passed to
relieve manufacturers who produce anti-terrorism products and
processes from liability for damages associated therewith. 162 While
we do not favor a legislative approach for reasons that will be detailed
below,' 63 it is nevertheless an option if beneficial software is truly not
being brought to market because of liability concerns. Bear in mind
that strict liability applies to defective products; we wish to create an
environment where beneficial and not defective software can be
marketed, but where defective software is discouraged in the first
instance and its producers are made liable for the defects that cause
injury.
When reviewing the costs and benefits of applying strict liability
to defective software, we strike the balance in favor of its application.
As the Greenman court said so many years ago, it is sound policy to
place the burden on the one who is in the best position to avoid the
defect in the first place,' 64 even though doing so may pose an extreme
hardship on one producer or another.
VI. WHY SOFTWARE? WHY Now?
The previous section discussed the policies underlying strict
liability and how those policies are fostered by applying the doctrine
to software. In this section we consider the conditions under which
strict liability would be so applied and the limitations on doing so.
160. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (2000).
161. Id.
162. Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the
SAFETY Act), 6 U.S.C. § 441 (Supplement 2004).
163. See infra notes 196-199 and accompanying text.
164. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
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Additionally, we articulate specific attributes of the software industry
that suggest the timing is right. In so doing, we rely heavily on the
aeronautical charts cases for support.
165
First, we argue that the software should be considered a
"product" for product liability purposes. We find wholly unpersuasive
the claim that software is information only and is intangible and
should not be considered in the same category as automobiles,
pharmaceuticals, and even hardware. Software's value lies in the fact
that it does something, i.e., it performs a task.166 Although Professor
Samuelson was not writing about product liability, she asserts that
computer programs and physical machines are more alike than
different. 167 For example, like machines, each unit performs an
identical task, is comprised of many component parts (lines of code),
and the components must work together like a machine with gears
and pulleys. 68 Cases have held 169 and commentators have argued
170
that software is a good for both warranty and strict liability purposes.
Rather than trying to make software conform to a definition that
would be appropriate for a physical good, we think the better
approach is to say that software will be treated as a good, whether it
actually is a good or not. In other words, it shares enough
characteristics of a good that, when viewed in the light of strict
liability policies, it should similarly be considered a good. Electricity
has been considered a good,' 7 ' as have blood172 and aeronautical
charts. 173 Software should be no different than those examples
because of its use by people, its capacity to do harm, and the inability
of those affected to meaningfully evaluate its safety.
165. See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
166. Samuelson et. al., supra note 152, at 2316.
167. Id. at 2320.
168. Id. at 2320-22.
169. See supra notes 122-123 and accompanying text.
170. See Kawawa, supra note 58, at 498; Phillips, supra note 57; Horovitz, supra note 1.
171. See, e.g., Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc., 642 P.2d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981),
affd, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984); Elgin Airport Inn, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 410
N.E.2d 620 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), revd in part, 432 N.E.2d 259 (I1. 1982); Schriner v. Pa. Power
& Light Co., 501 A.2d 1128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Ransome v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 275
N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1979).
172. See, e.g., Cunningham v. McNeal Mem'l Hosp., 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970); Jackson
v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 232 A.2d 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967), rev'd, 249 A.2d 65 (N.J.
1969). But see, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973); Samson v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 377 S.E.2d 311 (S.C. 1989).
173. See supra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
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To declare software a product similarly does not implicate the
First Amendment. The book cases 74 did not treat information
contained within the books as products, in part, because of concerns
about chilling expression. Software is not information in the same
way that the words in a book are information. Returning to the
functionality argument, software's value lies within its behavior, not
its text.175 It is embedded in devices to cause them to work. It is not
the expression that is important, but rather its function.
Correspondingly, the information in software code is factual 176 (like
aeronautical charts)--not editorial, not political, not literary-and, as
such, it is not in need of the full measure of First Amendment
protection that other kinds of information enjoy.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts contains a definition of product
that some say177 would preclude the inclusion of software in it.'78 To
the extent that it may be true, we urge courts not to adopt the
definition and, instead, focus on the policies underlying strict liability,
not verbal niceties, when applying strict liability to software. We
align with the view of David Lannetti that product liability law must
be flexible enough to include "new items that may not qualify as
products under current guidance but nevertheless should be governed
by existing product liability law, based on the policy objectives
undergirding this field of law."'179 Courts and commentators have
routinely considered software a good under the UCC. 80 It does not
strain credulity to transition from "good" to "product" for strict
liability purposes and based on policy grounds, regardless of the
Restatement's language.
174. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
175. Samuelson, supra note 152, at 2315.
176. See Larmkin, supra note 57, at 767.
177. See Lannetti, supra note 57.
178. For purposes of this Restatement:
(a) A product is tangible personal property distributed commercially for use or
consumption. Other items, such as real property and electricity, are products
when the context of their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the
distribution and use of tangible personal property that it is appropriate to apply
the rules stated in this Restatement.
(b) Services, even when provided commercially, are not products.
(c) Human blood and human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not
subject to the rules of this Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 19 (1998).
179. Lannetti, supra note 57, at 800 n.9.
180. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, the question of whether software is actually sold when
it is licensed does not concern us. 18 1 Courts have routinely applied
UCC principles to software transactions 8 2 without splitting hairs over
whether the transfer is a license-as characterized by the parties-or
actually a sale. The transfer puts the product into the stream of
commerce where it can cause harm. That fact alone should dictate
strict liability, regardless of how the parties label their transaction.
Having dispensed with the license/sale and goods/intangibles
dilemmas, we turn to the conditions under which we envision the
application of strict liability to software. The first component must be
an injured user, consumer, or bystander. This will effectively
eliminate all the economic loss cases from the broad sweep of strict
liability. Many recent articles undertake an analysis of who should be
liable for insecure systems that permit hackers, the introduction of
viruses, terrorists, and the like.183 Unless these instances give rise to
foreseeable physical injury, they would not be treated under a strict
liability regime according to our conception. Even then, it would be
necessary for a defect to cause the harm, not an outside force
misusing the software. Also, the myriad of cases that are brought by
purchasers who want their money back or their business losses
compensated would not be able to utilize this cause of action. We
confine our call for strict liability to cases where there is a foreseeable
risk of physical injury to people when software is defective.
Next, we envision a mass-marketed product. Most custom
software is too bound up in the product/service dichotomy to qualify.
That being said, we define mass-market very liberally. We are
mindful of the aeronautical charts cases where the courts held that the
chart was a product, in part, because it was mass-marketed. 184 The
charts are for use by pilots-a very small segment of the population.
They are not available in the local bookstore or consumer goods store.
Yet, as with the computer software we are considering, if there is a
defect in the chart, the consequences extend well beyond the user of
the chart. Consider medical monitoring software. It is not available to
181. See, e.g., Kemp, supra note 124 and cases cited note 122.
182. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Robin A. Brooks, Deterring the Spread of Viruses Online: Can Tort Law
Tighten the 'Net'?, 17 REV. LITIG. 343 (1998); Cheryl S. Massingale & A. Faye Borthick, Risk
Allocation for Computer System Security Breaches: Potential Liability for Providers of
Computer Services, 12 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 167 (1990); Michael D. Scott, Liability for
Insecure Systems, 9 CYBERSPACE LAW. 1 (Mar./Apr. 2004); Steve Lohr, Product Liability
Lawsuits Are New Threat to Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2003, at C2.
184. Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
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just any purchaser, but the impact, should it be defective, is wide and
devastating to those who are harmed by the software, even though
they did not purchase it and it was not marketed to them. The air
traffic control systems are guided by software. Although the market
for the actual system is very limited, the number of persons affected
by the system is enormous. Software in automobiles, on the other
hand, fits the usual mass-marketing concept. Many people purchase
automobiles made by a number of manufacturers. While millions of
automobiles are purchased every year, the impact of defective
software within the automobile is not much different from that of a
defective air traffic control system, which is sold to a very limited
group of purchasers. In defining mass-market, we do not evaluate the
number of units sold, but rather the scope of the impact a defect in the
software would have on people. "Mass-marketed" must be
distinguished from "marketed to the masses." If the software has the
potential to affect in harmful ways a large number of people,
1 85
regardless of how widely it is distributed, it meets this standard.
Harkening back to Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.'
86
we would require that the consumer be unable to evaluate the quality
of the product so that the burden falls to the manufacturer to make a
quality product in the first instance. In this age of technology, this is
an easy requirement to meet. Neither the passenger aboard a
commercial flight, the patient in the hospital, nor even the driver of a
car can understand or even see the software operations going on
around him or her. Very few in the general population can read, let
alone understand, the object code that comprises software.
Most importantly, and as discussed earlier, 187 we believe that the
industry is sufficiently mature to bear the cost of strict liability. It is
generally understood that early tort law developed to protect
emerging industries. 188 That may have been the case with software as
well, but it is no longer accurate to refer to the industry as emerging
185. See LaRossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968), where the small
group affected by the product compelled the court not to apply strict liability.
186. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
187. See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet
Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 259-62 (1995) (stating the defenses in tort law developed to
protect industrialization, citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1780-1860, 99-161(1977)); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and
Legal Lag: An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77 (2003) (finding the
information industry to not be paying its way, just like railroads, canals, and factories in 19'h
century); Wolpert, supra note 2, at 519 (stating that the liability for defective software has been
slow to develop).
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and in need of protection. Previously we described the growth of the
industry.' 89 Today, the industry is a multi-billion dollar segment of the
economy. The market has seen significant consolidation and now a
few companies dominate in the major product categories.190 A 2002
study by the National Institute of Standards and Technology pegged
the cost of faulty software at $59.5 billion a year. 191 All of these
indicators say that the industry is capable of paying for the cost of
injuries due to defects in the software. Other product manufacturers
have managed the liability issue. Software manufacturers should as
well. Otherwise, the industry is relieved of paying the true cost of its
wrongdoing.192 That is precisely what tort law seeks to avoid.
We recognize that the application of strict liability to defective
software includes all the concepts, defenses, and limitations that
accompany its application to all other products. We review some of
them next. Because strict liability is a creature of the common law,
there is some variation from state to state, exacerbated by statutory
limitations that a number of states have enacted. 193 We focus on
elements of the strict liability claim that are common to most states.
A. Manufacturing or Design Defect?
Unless there is an error in the copying of software code, software
defects are likely to be considered design defects. As stated
previously, software that does something unexpected is nevertheless
responding exactly as it has been programmed to do. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts applies a consumer expectation test to design
defects, 194 i.e., the product was defective if it did not meet the
reasonable consumer's expectations of safety. In contrast, the
Restatement (Third) returns design defect cases to a negligence
standard when it requires that, in order for there to be liability, the
"foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative... and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe." 195 The requirement of a reasonable alternative
design is reminiscent of the negligence standard. While we prefer that
189. See supra notes 3-31 and accompanying text.
190. Samuelson et al., supra note 152, at 2376.
191. See Coughlin, supra note 149. The number includes costs such as fixes, downtime,
and lost business and is not confined to the costs of physical injury.
192. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 188, at 140.
193. Zollers et al., supra note 159, at 1032-40.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
195. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS § 2(b) (1998).
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design and manufacturing defects both be tested under a pure strict
liability theory, even those states that have adopted the Restatement
(Third) can find liability for faulty software design.
The reasonable alternative design standard assumes that the
technology has not advanced to the point, or that the inherent
characteristics of the product are such that the danger can be avoided.
An example would be a pharmaceutical product that does what it is
supposed to do, but the biochemistry, even in its perfect state,
produces serious side effects. In the case of software, the reasonable
alternative design is the one that does what the software is supposed
to do and not something else. The product is marketed to, and usually
does, produce a particular result. Thus, medical software is designed
to monitor accurately the patient's condition and airplane software is
designed to fly a plane safely. When a bug in the software causes
injury or death, there is a reasonable alternative design-the program
without the bug that works properly.
B. Causation
Naturally, the defective software must be the cause of the
eventual harm. Claims can be made that the operator, not the
software, was the causative agent in producing the harm. This was
true in many of the aeronautical charts cases, where the chart maker
claimed pilot error. One explanation, later refuted, in the case of over-
radiation was that the technician did not operate the machine
correctly. Years of litigation against Audi for the sudden acceleration
of some of its cars finally ended with the conclusion that drivers were
inadvertently hitting the gas instead of the brakes, thereby causing the
cars to lurch forward.
Our concept of strict liability applied to software requires that
the injured party establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defect in the software caused the harm. Sometimes this will not be
easy to establish. However, the element of causation is absolutely
essential to the cause of action. Without it, software manufacturers
could be liable for anything that happens in proximity to the software.
That is not our intent; rather, we propose that manufacturers be
responsible for defects in their product that cause injury.
C. State of the Art Defense
Either by case law or by statute, many states recognize the state
of the art defense in a strict liability claim, i.e., if the product
conforms to the state of the art at the time it is produced, then it will
2005]
780 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L... [Vol. 21
not be considered defective. It could be argued that the state of the art
in software is that all products contain bugs, and it is impossible to
produce a software program without them. We find this argument
wholly unpersuasive.
Software has matured to the point where it can and does operate
safely. Millions of people travel safely every day to and from their
destinations in automobiles loaded with software. Legions of patients
are monitored accurately and receive appropriate treatment with
medical software. Millions of airline passengers fly safely in planes
controlled by software. The state of the art is such that software that
performs properly and safely is a reality, not a dream. Consequently,
the state of the software art and technology has evolved to a point
where we can expect it to do what it is supposed to do. Any deviation
from that should not be sheltered by the state of the art defense.
The defense has the effect of turning strict liability back to a
negligence standard. While it may be true that failure to detect an
error in millions of lines of code is not negligence that is not what the
strict liability doctrine is about. Strict liability holds manufacturers of
products to a higher standard in order to ensure that safe products
reach the market. If the doctrine dissuades software manufacturers
from releasing products that can cause serious injury and death when
defective, then it has achieved its purpose.
VII. CONCLUSION
It may seem an odd time to be advocating for an extension of the
strict liability doctrine to include software. The current product
liability environment is one of restriction, not extension. Tort reform
legislation that restricts some pieces of established product liability
doctrine is occurring in the states, 196 and, in a piecemeal way, at the
federal level. 197 With respect to software specifically, the Uniform
Computer Information Transaction Act 98 (UCITA), specifically
196. Zollers et al., supra note 159, at 1032-40.
197. While comprehensive federal reform has not occurred, individual pieces of legislation
have limited liability for particular industries and in particular settings. Examples include
vaccines (National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 et. seq.
(2000)), private aircraft (General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2000)), industries creating anti-terrorism products (Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 441 et. seq. (Supplement 2004)), and the recent
limitations on class action lawsuits (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4 (2005)).
198. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTION ACT §§ 101 et. seq. (2002). The Act has only
been adopted by two states, Maryland (Maryland Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW II §§ 22-101 to -816 (Supplement 2003)) and Virginia
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allows disclaimers and limitations of liability in electronic transfers of
software and information. However, none of these constricting
developments dissuade us from our position that the time is right for
software to be subjected to strict liability.
In the forty-plus years that strict liability has been a part of the
legal landscape, manufacturers and suppliers of goods have adjusted
their manufacturing, testing, and inspection processes to adjust to the
heightened liability. It may be true that some businesses were not able
to cope with the legal environment and failed, but the market place
has rewarded those who were able to respond appropriately. We
submit that it will be no different with software. Granted, certain
practices will have to be strengthened or abandoned altogether, but
we submit that is precisely the point. If the end result is to put
improved software on the market that works properly and does not
cause injury to people, then the doctrine will have accomplished its
purposes.
We rely on the courts, not legislatures, to make the transition. In
their historic role of crafting a common law that reflects sound public
policy, the courts are in the best position to create this new
environment. Strict liability is a creature of the common law; thus, it
is appropriate for courts to continue to refine and develop the doctrine
as changes in technology occur. The seeds to grow the doctrine are
present in existing case law, whether or not the case is about software.
It is actually a small step to move from applying strict liability to
cases involving aeronautical charts or car braking systems that are not
driven by software to ones that are. Most important, courts are more
removed than legislative bodies from the political exigencies that
currently call for the contraction of liability rules. While courts often
experience a so-called legal lag 99 when addressing new technologies
and new social conditions, we believe that the lag period is over. The
software industry has enjoyed a half-century honeymoon period in
which it could develop and flourish. It is now time for it to contribute
to the costs society incurs from software's use. We believe that the
courts are in the best position to recognize that fact and make it
happen.
(Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to -509.2
(Michie 2001)). Both states have a substantial high-technology industry presence. Other states
have passed so-called bomb shelter legislation, providing that the disclaimer provisions of
UCITA will not become law in those states. See H.F. 2205, 78th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa
2000); S.B. 1023, 2001 Leg., 144th Sess. (N.C. 2001); S.B. 204, 75th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess.
(W. Va. 2001); H.B. 148, 2003 Leg., 67th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 2003).
199. See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 188.
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As we review the existing cases and the news accounts of
software failures that cause personal injury, we are convinced that the
timing is right for the shift to strict product liability. There have
already been instances of software failure causing injury, and there
can only be more as software interfaces with ever-increasing amounts
of human activity. Given the current uses of software, it is not hard to
imagine future applications and the drastic consequences that will
result if the software is faulty. We think it sound public policy to have
a strict liability regime in place to treat those consequences, should
they occur, rather than putting injured parties to the task of proving
negligence.
Whatever space the software industry may have needed to
develop and mature has surely come and gone. The industry is
consolidating and strengthening, and large market players have
emerged as dominant forces in the economy. Realistically, it is not the
independent software developer or a small company that develops the
software we seek to hold strictly liable should something go wrong.
The sophistication and complexity required of medical monitoring
software and the software that runs power plants and planes is
typically developed by established companies. These companies not
only have the technological ability to create the software, but also the
resources to devote to the extra testing that strict liability requires.
They also have the resources to pay for injuries that may result from
defects or to purchase insurance to cover such an eventuality.
All the conditions are in place for the application of strict
liability to software defects. The case law is poised to move in that
direction. As software that can cause injury if defective becomes
more and more a part of our daily lives, the policy reasons underlying
strict liability are congruent with the application of the doctrine to
software. The industry is sufficiently established and mature to be
able to withstand the enhanced liability. The reasons for treating
software differently from all other products no longer withstand close
scrutiny, if they ever did. We urge the extension of strict liability to
defective software that causes injury at the earliest opportunity.
